The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony by Jacobs, Albert C.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DECREES
FOR ALIMONY
ALBERT C. JACOBS*
In a court of competent jurisdiction of a state in which a husband and wife are
resident, the wife successfully sues the husband for a divorce or separation and ali-
mony. The decree awards her alimony for the support of herself and children, if
there be any, either in the form of a lump sum or installment payments. To avoid
the sanction of this court, the husband, leaving no appreciable assets behind him, flees
to a second state. The wife, in dire need, and no longer possessing an effective
remedy in the state where the divorce was granted, attempts in the second state to
enforce the decree providing for support. Or the wife, having obtained a decree for
divorce or separation and alimony in a state where she was then resident, returns to
the state of her former residence and seeks to obtain payments under that decree.
These patterns are typical; the cases presenting questions as to the enforcement of
foreign1 decrees of alimony very generally follow one of these fact situations. For
convenience of reference, in the discussion which follows husband and wife will be
designated by the symbols H and W, respectively. The state which is the forum of
the divorce action wherein alimony is awarded will be designated as F-z; the second
state, the forum of the suit brought on the alimony decree, as F-2.
What remedies are available to W in F-2? Must the courts thereof give "full faith
and credit" to the alimony decree of the F-i tribunal? If so, what does this mean?
Is it material whether the F-z decree is for permanent or temporary alimony, whether
it provides for a lump sum or for installment payments, whether it is subject to
modification by the F-i court? Can W sue in F-2 for the lump sum or for the pay-
ments which have accrued and are in arrears? Can she do anything to secure the pay-
ment of the future installments as they come due? What is the nature of her remedy
in F-2? Must she sue at law, relying upon the attendant legal execution, or can she
proceed in equity? If equitable relief is open to her in F-2, is she entitled to the
remedies which would have been available to her had she obtained a local alimony
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Landlord and Tenant (1932); Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (2d Ed. 1939); and of
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'The term "foreign" is applied, as the antonym of "domestic," to sister states of the United States as
well as to foreign nations.
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decree there? Or can she take advantage of the remedies which would have been
open to her in F-i?
The problem of the remedies available for the enforcement in F-2 of a decree for
alimony rendered in F-i has become increasingly important. Divorce rates have risen
to such an extent in recent years that they have become the highest in our history.
218,ooo decrees were issued in 1935, probably more in the succeeding years. 2 When
a husband has been ordered to pay money for the support of a woman no longer his
wife or from whom he is legally separated, it is not at all strange that he should indi-
cate an inclination not to comply with the decree. The arranged, the friendly divorce,
it is true, is typical of our times.3 In the amicable divorce or separation economic
matters are generally arranged out of court. It is in the real contest, where parties are
not on friendly terms, that most alimony awards are made.4 With the evolution of
faster and more accessible means of transportation, with the development of the
automobile, the streamliner and the airliner, husbands against whom alimony de-
crees have been rendered in F-z find flight from the state to escape the enforcement
thereof more and more easy. Problems of real social import are thereby raised. It is
just as much a need of society and justice that alimony be paid in F-2 as it was
in F-i.Y
The law concerning the enforcement of a foreign alimony judgment is still in an
evolutionary stage. At one time there was considerable hesitation as to the extra-
territorial effect of an F-i alimony decree.6 In Battey, Executor v. Holbrook,7 it was
said by way of dicta, that "upon a decree for alimony, it may be well to remark by
way of caution, we suppose no action will lie in another jurisdiction."
A decree for alimony is an order of a competent court, usually incidental to a
suit for a divorce a vinculo or a mensa et thoro, ordering the husband to pay a certain
amount, either in a lump sum or periodically for the support of the wife and chil-
dren, if there be any." It is generally an obligation of the same nature as the marital
duty to support. Thus it is an obligation in the enforcement of which the state has a
paramount public interest-the wife and children must not become public charges
and derelicts. For this reason there attaches to an alimony decree a public policy in
securing to the wife the performance of this duty to support. The remedies for
enforcement are more effective than those available in the case of an ordinary law
2 The last report of the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, on Marriage and
Divorce, was issued in 1934 and covered the year 1932. For subsequent statistics, see Stouffer and Spencer,
Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years (Nov. 1936) ANNALs, 56-69.
' Collusive and Consent Divorce and the New York Anomaly (1936) 36 CoL. L. RFv. 1121; Jacobs,
Attack on Decrees of Divorce (1936) 36 Mscs. L. REV. 749; Sayre, Divorce by Judicial Consent (1933) x8
IOWA L. REv. 493.
' According to CamN, STATIsnCAL ANALYsIS Op AmERicAN DivoRcE (1932), nine per cent of the
divorce petitions now request alimony, and it is granted in six per cent.
'See Ostrander v. Ostrander, x9o Minn. 547, 550, 252 N. V. 449 (1934).
*See Barber v. Barber, 2 Pin. 297, 1 Chand. 280 (Wis. 1849); Battey, Ex'r. v. Holbrook, ii Gray 212,
213 (Mass. 1858). 'Supra note 6.
'See 2 VERNlER, AMRICAN F&NiLY LAws (1932) 259-325, 451-462; Munson, Some Aspects of the
Nature of Permanent Alimony (x916) s6 COL. L. REv. 217.
252 LAw AND CoNTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
judgment or money decree.9 A local alimony order is generally accorded the full
scope of equitable enforcement. In addition to the ordinary means available for the
collection of money judgments, the injunction,' 0 sequestration of the husband's prop-
erty," receivership, 12 the writ of ne exeat,'3 and contempt proceedings14 are often
open to the wife. In other ways as well, because of the public import involved, the
law has given special protection to an alimony judgment. It survives the bankruptcy
of the husband,15 it generally prevails over the exemption laws;' 6 by the weight of
authority it is exempt from garnishment, except for debts contracted for necessaries
subsequent to the divorce;' 7 imprisonment for failure to pay alimony does not violate
the constitutional provisions against imprisonment for debt.' 8 These will suffice to
illustrate the important point that a decree for alimony is sui generis.
In the discussion which follows it will be assumed that the F-z court rendering
the alimony judgment has jurisdiction over the subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties.' It will further be assumed that the divorce or judicial sep-
aration, where such is involved, is one which will be recognized in F-2 either under
the full faith and credit clause, on the ground of comity, or because of estoppel or
some analogous principle. 20
The Constitution of the United States21 and the statutes enacted thereunder 22
enjoin the courts of the several states to give "full faith and credit" to the judicial
proceedings of every other state. It is elementary that this calls for more than the
The statutory material on enforcement and security provisions is collected in 2 VERMER, AMmucAN
FmaILy LAWS 290-303. See MAss. GEN. LAWs (1932) C. 208, §§12-14, 25, 36; MiCH. ComP. LAws (1929)
§§12742, 12743, 12747, 12770, 12780, 13910; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac. §§1171, 1171a, 1172.
'
0
°n re White, 113 Cal. 282, 45 Pac. 323 (1896).
"Castell v. Castell, 38 Ark. 477 (1882); Swallow v. Swallow, 84 N. J. Eq. 109, 92 Ad. 872 (1915).
1 2 Stallings v. Stallings, 127 Ga. 464, 56 S. E. 469 (1907).
'a Boucicault v. Boucicault, 21 Hun. 431 (N. Y. 188o).
"'Foster v. Foster, 130 Mass. 189 (188o).
i5 1 U. S. C. §35; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575 (1901).
"
0 Szymanski v. Szymanski, i88 Iowa 931, 176 N. W. 8o6 (192o); Fowler v. Fowler, 61 Okla. 28o,
x6I PaC. 227 (1918).
"See Harper, Garn shment for Alimony (1928) 13 IowA L. REv. 164.
"s Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 Ad. 488 (1929).
102 BAa.a, CONFUTar OF LAws (1935) 1435-1436: "Since this decree (for alimony) is in its effect a
mere decree for the payment of money by the respondent, it is clearly a decree in personam and not in
rem and in order to support it there must therefore be personal jurisdiction over the respondent. If, as
often happens, the respondent in the divorce case is served only by publication, being a non-resident, it is
not possible to render a valid decree against him for alimony.
"When, however, the respondent is before the court for any reason, the court, having personal juris-
diction over him, may render a decree. This happens if the respondent appears either in the original
action or in a later proceeding to dispute the allowance of alimony; if he is served with process either
originally; or before the alimony is decreed; if he is a respondent in a successful cross libel and therefore
came into court with the original complaint; or if he is domiciled within the state and is required in
accordance with the law of the state to come into court."
"0 See Jacobs, supra note 3.
"'Art. IV, §i: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner
in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
22 28 U. S. C. §688: "And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such
full faith and credit given to them, in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from which they are taken."
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mere recognition of the F-i judicial proceedings. The judgment is to be enforced; it
must be made effective so that execution can issue thereon in F-2. Just a hundred
years ago the Supreme Court of the United States said :23
"By the law of the 26th day of May, 1790, the judgment is made a debt of record, not
examinable upon its merits; but it does not carry with it, into another state, the efficacy of a
judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by execution. To give it the force of a
judgment in another state, it must be made a judgment there, and can only be executed in
the latter as its laws permit."
A foreign judgment for a sum of money is a debt of record upon which an action
can be maintained. It is not enforceable simply by issuing execution thereon or by
any other remedy available to judgment creditors 2 4
"No action will lie," however, "in another state on a judgment which is not final and con-
dusive in a state where it was rendered."2 5
This is fundamental and underlies the law dealing with the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of money judgments. In the case of Pennington v. Gibson,26 Mr. Justice Daniel
said:
"We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in every instance in which an action
of debt can be maintained upon a judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such
judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for an ascer-
tained and specific amount and nothing more... -27
At one time there was considerable doubt about this proposition. 8 But it is now
fundamental that if the F-i decree is final and conclusive, be it legal or equitable, an
action can be maintained thereon in F-2.29
So much for money judgments in general. A decree for alimony, whether calling
for a lump sum or periodic payments, is generally not subject to alteration in the
absence of express power to the contrary reserved in the decree itself or provided for
by express statute.30 An alimony judgment not subject to modification would seem
2' M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325 (U. S. 1839) per Wayne, J.
"RESTATEzMNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (r934) §433.
Rohden v. Rohden, 119 Misc. 624, 625, i98 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1922): "Judgments and orders of
other states have no extraterritorial force as mandates." Per McAvoy, J. Accord: Hardy v. Hardy, 136
Misc. 759, 240 N. Y. Supp. 826 (1930).
252 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1390. See also REsrATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §§434, 435.
§435: "A valid foreign judgment for the payment of money which by the law of the state in which it
was rendered is not a final judicial determination of the right to payment will not be enforced."
28 16 Ho\%. 65, 77 (U. S. X853).
IT See Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R. I. 27, 28, 57 Ad. zo58 (1904).
18 See Barber v. Barber, supra note 6.
t See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1381; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) §434, comment C.
° Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 390, 117 N. W. 89o (19o8): "We think the authorities generally
sustain the proposition that a decree for alimony in a divorce a vinculo made without reserve, although
payable in installments, is final and cannot be challenged after enrollment of the decree."
2 VERNIER, AMEmECAN FAMILY LAWS 274-275: "If alimony in absolute divorce is a substitute for the
wife's right to support by her husband, it would seem that it should be subject to change according to
changes in the needs of the wife or in the ability and proper obligations of the husband, just as the right
to support would change if the marriage had continued. This seems to be the rule of the ecclesiastical
courts in limited divorce cases, and of the courts of a few American jurisdictions in cases of absolute
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to have the finality of an ordinary money judgment. It is common practice, however,
for courts to reserve in the decree the power to vary, modify or annul it, and statutes
conferring such power exist in many states.31 Such being the case, has the alimony
decree that final and conclusive character upon which enforcement in F-2 is con-
ditioned? Does it fall within the pattern providing for the enforcement of money
judgments?
Where the decree of F-i calls for the payment of alimony in a lump sum, and
there is no power statutory or otherwise to annul, vary or modify it, we are, it seems,
dealing with something like an ordinary money judgment. This situation presents
no difficulty so far as legal enforcement in F-2 is concerned. And, as would be
expected, courts have given full faith and credit to such a decree 32
If F-i has no statute authorizing modification or annulment and the court has
reserved no such power unto itself, a decree calling for periodic payments would seem
to be final and conclusive, at least as to the accrued and unpaid installments. They
would seem to constitute a debt, and since not subject to modification or cancellation,
would be final and conclusive and entitled to recognition in F-2. But suppose that by
statute or express reservation in the decree the court has the power to vary, modify or
annul? Is it material whether this power extends to accrued and unpaid installments
or merely to those not yet due? To answer these questions it is necessary to turn to
an analysis of the leading cases.
The famous case of Barber v. Barber,33 in the Supreme Court of the United
States, is the starting point of all discussion in this field. In 1847, the Court of
Chancery of New York had granted Huldah Parker a divorce a mensa et thoro from
her husband and had directed the latter to pay her alimony in quarterly installments.
Although the separation was decreed to be forever, the power to modify was reserved
by a provision that the parties might at any time thereafter, by their joint petition,
apply to the court to have the decree modified or discharged. It was provided that
the unpaid installments of alimony should bear interest "and that execution might
issue therefor toties quoties." The husband failed to pay any of the alimony and
divorce. The prevailing rule in our civil courts appears to be that the court cannot alter the decree after
it has been made, unless power to do so was reserved therein or unless there is statutory authority to do so.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that such authority should not be necessary. The majority rule seems to
proceed upon the theory that the decree is rcs judicata as to alimony. Admittedly this is correct as to the
state of facts existing when the decree was made."
a12 VERNIER, AiEIcAN FAMILY LAws 275, points out that such statutes exist in 31 of the 5x American
jurisdictions. See CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937), §139; MAss. GEN. LAws (932), C. 208, §37; N. Y.
Cirv. PRAc. Acr, §§xa55, 1159, 1170.
32 Dow v. Blake, 148 IIl. 76, 87, 35 N. E. 761 (1893): The plaintiff wife successfully maintained an
action of debt upon a judgment in her favor in Wisconsin for $3i,ooo as alimony. "We see no reason why
a final decree, which directs the payment of a specific sum of money, should not have the same force
and effect as a judgment at law; and it has not been shown that it does not have such force and effect in
the State of Wisconsin. Where such a final decree is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one
State, the Constitution of the United States requires that full faith and credit be given to it in every
other State. It makes no difference, so far as the duty of the courts in another State to enforce it is
concerned, that the specific sum required to be paid by such a final decree is for alimony."
See also 2 BE.AL, CoNFLIcr OF LAws 1392.
as 21 How. 582 (U. S. 1858).
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removed to Wisconsin where he procured an ex parte absolute divorce.3 4 Sub-
sequently an action was brought by Mrs. Barber upon the common law side of the
Federal District Court in Wisconsin to recover the arrears of alimony.35 Relief was
denied, however, "for the reason that the remedy for the recovery of alimony was
in the court of chancery and not at law.' 3' A suit to recover the overdue alimony
was then commenced by the wife's next friend on the equity side of the court. The
defendant husband demurred on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court of
equity in that the plaintiff wife could not acquire a dornicil separate and apart from
his, since the marriage status was not dissolved by a judicial separation, and there
was, therefore, no diversity of citizenship; that relief could only be had in the Court
of Chancery of New York; and that it did not appear that the wife had exhausted
her remedies in New York. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant then
answered admitting the New York decree and not raising any question as to its
finality.3" From a decree for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The issue was thus stated by Mr. Justice Wayne:
"Whether a wife divorced a mensa et thoro can acquire another domiciliation in a state of
this Union different from that of her husband, to entitle her, by her next friend, to sue him
in a court of the United States having equitable jurisdiction, to recover from him alimony
due, and which he refuses to make any arrangement to pay; and whether a court of equity
is not a proper tribunal for a remedy in such a case."3 8
The court devoting the greater part of its opinion to the resolution of the real issue
in the case-whether the wife could set up a domicil separate and apart from her
husband's-concluded that the wife was entitled to sue. No point was made by
counsel as to the effect of the New York alimony decree.3 9 The court, however,
dealt with this situation:
"The decree.., is a judgment of record, and will be received as such by other courts. And
such a judgment or decree, rendered in any state of the United States, the court having
jurisdiction, will be carried to judgment in any other state, to have there the same binding
force that it has in the state in which it was originally given. For such a purpose, both the
equity courts of the United States and the same courts of the states have jurisdiction. '40
" "It is not necessary for us to pass any opinion upon the legality of the decree, or upon its operation
there or elsewhere to dissolve the vinculum of the marriage." 21 How. 582, 588 (U. S. 1858), per
Wayne, J. " Barber v. Barber, supra note 6.
" The husband had demurred on the ground that the wife's remedy was in equity. The sustaining
of the demurrer was affirmed. "The decree for alimony is a specific one for the support of the wife, and
in its nature distinct and temporary. It may be increased as the necessities of the case may require, and
the ability of the husband permit, or it may be diminished or dissolved. Hence it cannot be regarded as a
decree absolute for the payment of a sum certain, nor has it the force and effect of a judgment at law.
It belongs to that numerous class of decrees which, from their very nature, cannot be enforced in any other
than a court of chancery, where one exists." Per Larrabee, J., Barber v. Barber, 2 Pin. at 300, 1 Chand. at
284 (Wis. 1849).
See also dicta to the same effect in Battey, Ex'r v. Holbrook, supra note 6.
" The husband claimed that by the Wisconsin divorce his wife became a leme sole, and could not
sue by her next friend, and that her remedy was in a court of law.
38 21 How. 582, 584 (U. S. 1858).
"It did not appear whether the New York court had power to modify the decree as to accrued
installments.
"0 2X How. 582, 591 (U. S. 1858), per Wayne, J.
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Mr. Justice Wayne continued:
"When that has been done, it becomes a judicial debt of record against the husband, which
may be enforced by execution or attachment against his person, issuing from the court
which gave the decree; and when that cannot be done on account of the husband having
left or fled from that jurisdiction to another, where the process of that court cannot reach
him, the wife, by her next friend, may sue him, wherever he may be found or where he
shall have acquired a new domicil, for the purpose of recovering the alimony due to her, or
to carry the decree into judgment there with the same effect that it has in the state in
which the decree was given. Alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separation from
bed and board, is as much a debt of record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other
judgment for money is."'41
Due to the way in which the matter was presented and in which the issues were
formulated, these statements were undoubtedly mere dicta. The decision was that
the trial court did not err in giving effect to the New York decree. But by implica-
tion the court indicated that an F-i alimony decree, payable in installments, is a debt
of record 42 and as such is entitled to full faith and credit in F-2, until the decree is
recalled, even though it is subject to recall. As to the accrued installments it must
be enforced in F-2.43
The statements of the Supreme Court were followed in the cases which arose.
They were stated over and over again, becoming law in the state courts without
qualification.44
Then came another decision of the Supreme Court of the United States-the much
discussed and oft-misunderstood case of Lynde v. Lynde.4" The plaintiff wife sued
in New York to enforce a claim for alimony which had been obtained against the
defendant husband in a court of chancery in New Jersey. The New Jersey decree
adjudged that the plaintiff recover the sum of $7,840 as back alimony [the amount
decreed to be due and payable], counsel fees of $i,ooo; and that the defendant pay
permanent alimony of $8o a week from the date of the decree, authorizing the issue
of execution therefor, declaring these sums to be liens upon the defendant's real
'21 How. 582, 595 (U. S. 1858).
'The phrase "debt of record" originated at an early date to enable a person who had been awarded
a money equity decree to institute an action at law. Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22 (N. Y. i8o5). See Cook,
The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 COL. L. Rxv. io6, 240; Barbour, The Extra.Territorial Effect
of the Equitable Decree (i919) 17 MicH. L. REv. 527. The expression was adopted for its convenience in
signifying that a final decree was such a judgment as would be capable of supporting an action of debt.
See (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 726, 728; Pennington v. Gibson, supra note 23; McElroy v. McElroy, 208
Mass. 458, 464, 94 N. E. 696, 699 (i9ii).
"' See, however, the dissent of Daniel, J.: "This allowance is not in the nature of an absolute debt. It
is not unconditional, but always dependent upon the personal merits and conduct of the wife-merits and
conduct which must exist and continue, in order to constitute a valid claim to such an allowance. This
allowance might unquestionably be forfeited upon proof of criminality or misconduct of the wife, who
could not be permitted to enforce the payment of that to which it should be shown she had lost all just
claim; and this inhibition, it is presumed, might embrace as well a portion of that allowance at any time
in arrears, as its demand in future." 21 How. 582, 603 (U. S. 1858).
"Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. 761 (1893); Allen v. Allen, zoo Mass. 373 (x868); Brisbane v.
Dodson, 50 Mo. App. 170 (1892); Bullock v. Bullock, 57 N. J. L. 508, 31 At. 1024 (1895); Anonymous,
12 Abb. N. C. 16o (N. Y. i8oo); Wood v. Wood, 7 Misc. 579, 28 N. Y. C. 154 (1894); Trowbridge v.
Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (9oo). "'Lynde v. Lynde, x8x U. S. 183 (190).
TimE ENFORCEMENT OF FOICEGN DECREES FOR ALIMONY 257
estate, requiring him to give security for the payment of such sums, and providing
for sequestration and receivership in case of the defendant's failure to make the
prescribed payments or to furnish the prescribed security.
The Supreme Court of New York decreed that the plaintiff was entitled to a
judgment against the defendant, first, for the amount of alimony, counsel fee and
costs due or incurred under the New Jersey decree; second, for the amount of
alimony accrued since the date of the New Jersey decree; third, that he pay to her
$8o a week from the date of the decision, as and for permanent alimony; and lastly,
that he give a bond in the sum of $iooooo, to secure the payment of the several sums
specified and that, upon his failure to comply with the provisions of the decision, a
receiver might be appointed by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
The Appellate Division,46 upon the defendant's appeal, modified the judgment,
so that the plaintiff recovered of the defendant the sum of $8,840, representing the
amount of back alimony awarded by the New Jersey decree plus the $i,ooo counsel
fee. Both parties thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which unanimously
affirmed the judgment as above modifiedA7 In the words of Gray, J.:
"As a debt of record against the defendant the courts of this state should give it full credit
and effect; but as to its other provisions for future alimony and for equitable remedies to
enforce compliance, I do not think we should say that it falls within the rule of the Federal
Constitution. I do not think that the courts of this state should give effect to the decree by
enforcing any of the collateral remedies, which the prevailing party may be entitled to in
New Jersey and which the subsequent order gave to her.
"So far as it made provision for the payment of alimony in the future, it remained sub-
ject to the discretion of the chancellor and lacked conclusiveness of character. The chan-
cellor's action was not final on the subject.... The provision of the Federal Constitution,
which requires that full faith and credit shall be given to the judicial proceedings of
another state, in my opinion, should be deemed to relate to judgments, or decrees, which
are not only conclusive in the jurisdiction where rendered, but which are final in their
nature. If they, once and for all, establish a debt, or other obligation, against a party, the
record is available in other jurisdictions as a foundation for a judgment there."4 8
In the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion notable for its brevity,
the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.4 9 Mr. Justice Gray said:
"The decree for the payment of $8,840 was for a fixed sum already due, and the judgment
of the court below was properly restricted to that. The provision for the payment of
alimony in the future was subject to the discretion of the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, which might at any time alter it, and was not a final judgment for a fixed sum.
The provisions for bond, sequestration, receiver, and injunction, being in the nature of
execution, and not of judgment, could have no extraterritorial operation; but the action of
the courts of New York in these respects depended on the local statutes and practice of the
State, and involved no Federal question."50
'
6 Lynde v. Lynde, 41 App. Div. 280, 58 N. Y. Supp. 567 (5899).
'
7 Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979 (19oo).
'
81d. at 47-418, 56 N. E. 979.
"Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 583 (1901). 1 Id. at 587.
258 LAW AN CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court did not cite nor refer to Barber v.
Barber."- A limitation, however, was placed upon that case. Where the F-i alimony
decree was subject to alteration, modification or annulment, it was not final, and,
therefore, not within the full faith and credit clause. In such a situation the wife
should first have obtained a decree from the F-z court adjudging the installments
accrued and unpaid. On such a decree suit should then be brought in F-2."
The state courts were thrown into confusion as to the effect of this case upon the
statements of Mr. Justice Wayne in Barber v. Barber. Some tribunals clearly took
the position that Barber v. Barber, at least in so far as it was inconsistent with Lynde
v. Lynde, was overruled by the latter decision.58 If the installments were subject to
alteration or annulment, only the sums due and owing at the time of the F-X decree
were entitled to full faith and credit. This was so even though there had been no
alteration of the installments which had accrued since the F-i decree. Other courts
held that the burden was on the plaintiff in F-2 to allege and prove the finality of the
F-z decree." In Hunt v. Monroe 5 the court said: "It seems to us the safer rule is to
require proof of the laws of a sister state in this regard." Some courts, in spite of the
Lynde case, assumed in the absence of express proof to the contrary that the F-z
decree was final in regard to accrued and unpaid installments. In Wagner v. Wag-
ner,5 the court stated:
"The objection that an allowance is subject to alteration by the court ordering it, and so it
cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment, has little, if any, weight as to an
" Supra note 33.
"'See Levine v. Levine, 95 Ore. 94, 101-102, 187 Pac. 609 (1919).
"' Israel v. Israel, 148 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 3rd, 19o6): In a New York divorce action the husband had
been ordered to pay the wife $30 a week for the support of herself and children until the further order
of the court, and $223.85 as costs. In an action of assumpsit brought by the wife in the District Court of
Pennsylvania, judgment was given which included $2,13o representing alimony and maintenance for 71
weeks, of which sum $120, ori alimony for four weeks, was payable on the rendition of the New York
decree. The balance had accrued thereafter. "It appears that under the statutes of New York the judgment
or decree, so far as it directed the payment of alimony and maintenance not then accrued or payable could
at any time thereafter be annulled, varied or modified by the court rendering it. It, therefore, was not a
conclusive and final judgment or decree with respect to the sum of $2,o0, representing alimony and
maintenance for sixty-seven weeks accruing after its rendition. It did not constitute a fixed, unconditional
and absolute liability for its payment." Per Bradford, J., pp. 577-578. It was held that if the plaintiff
remitted the excess over $12o and costs, the judgment would be affirmed.
See also Freund v. Freund, 71 N. J. Eq. 524, 63 At. 756 (x9o6): "This decision [Lynde v. Lynde]
controls the earlier decision of Barber v. Barber, .. . and overrules it, if it be inconsistent." A1t'd without
OpiniOn, 72 N. J. Eq. 943, 73 Ad. 1117 (19o6).
Valiquet v. Valiquet, 177 Fed. 994, 996 (C. C. D. N. J. i9o9): "The bill shows that all of the alimony
which had accrued, according to the decree, has been paid. As to the alimony thereafter and from time
to time made payable, the decree was not a final judgment for a fixed sum." Per Cross, J.
See also Bleuer v. Bleuer, 27 Okla. 25, 11o Pac. 736 (i9io); compare Campbell v. Campbell, 28 Okla.
838, 115 Pac. 1i1 (19ri).
" Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85, 91, 75 N. E. 92 (1905): "In order to bring herself within the provision
the plaintiff must show that the decree (of Maine court awarding $6 week) was final. The decree had
reference simply to future payments, and generally a decree in the form of this one is subject to modifica-
tion by the court which passed it."
55 32 Utah 428, 436, 91 Pac. 269, 272 (1907). The plaintiff had not alleged that the Colorado decree
was final nor had she set forth Colorado statutes or decisions to that effect. judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed.
GO 26 R. 1. 27, 29, 57 Ad. 1058 (1904), per Stiness, C. J.
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amount already due at the time of suit. An accrued amount would not be changed by the
court if the debtor was able to pay it, and a suit on a decree is but a step to enforce such
payment."
The decision to a large extent was placed upon the grounds of public policy.5 The
needs of the wife are the same whether she sues in F-i or F-2. Other courts took the
same position.5
Thus, as the result of the Lynde case the effectiveness of the wife's remedy in
F-2 was curtailed materially. As a practical matter, in but few cases did the court
decide that alimony was due and owing at the time of the F-i decree. And again,
most decrees calling for future payments were, as they should be, subject to modifica-
tion at the hands of the F-i tribunal.
A few years later the Supreme Court of the United States again had occasion to
deal with the matter, this time in the case of Sistare v. Sistare5 9 In 1899 a New York
court had granted the plaintiff wife a separation from bed and board and had ordered
the defendant husband to pay her weekly $22.5o for the support of herself and a
minor child. It was further ordered that the plaintiff have leave to apply, from time
to time, for such orders at the foot of the judgment as might be necessary for its
enforcement and for the protection and enforcement of her rights. Furthermore, a
New York statute provided that the court might, upon the application of either
party, after due notice to the other, by order, annul, vary or modify such directions.60
In July, 1904, none of the installments of alimony having been paid, and the New
York decree not having been altered, modified or annulled, the wife sued in Con-
necticut to recover the amount then in arrears. The trial court gave her judgment
for $5,805, the arrears of alimony due at the time of the commencement of the
action. On appeal this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Errors.61 The
court held that by the laws of New York the decree was not final, even as to accrued
installments.0 2 The decree calling for future payments, even though those sued for
were accrued and due, did not, therefore, constitute a debt of record. It was not a
final judgment which by virtue of the full faith and credit clause it was the duty of
7 Id. at 28, 57 Ad. 1058 (r904): "The tendency of courts, and the better reason, is in favor of en-
forcing such decrees where the only question involved is the payment of money. An obvious advantage in
this course is that it tends to -unify the remedial agencies of the country by making them enforceable in
all its parts. It would be a reproach to our system of legal administration if one could escape from the
operation of a judicial decree by going into another state. This is one country, and so far as possible it
should have one law. Whatever tends to make the operation of law and legal remedies equally effective in
all parts of the land is carrying out the true idea of a common country. A party against whom a judg-
ment stands should not be shielded by the fact that he is not in the state where it was rendered. In a state
where a decree is given for allowance at stated periods it would be enforced and so it should be enforced
elsewhere it can be."
" Rogers v. Rogers, 46 Ind. App. 506, 89 N. E. 9oi (x909), rehearing denied, 46 Ind. App. 5o6, 92
N. E. 664 (i909); Moore v. Moore, 40 Misc. 162, 81 N. Y. Supp. 729 (903).
GO218 U. S. 1 (1909).
"N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr, §1170, formerly CODE CIV. PRoC., §1771.
o Sistare v. Sistare, 8o Conn. 1, 66 Ad. 772 (1907).
"The right of modification or annulment which is thus reserved to the courts is one which extends
to overdue and unsatisfied payments as well as to those which may accrue in the future." Id. at 4, 66 Ad.
at 773 (1907), per Prentice, J.
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the Connecticut court to enforce. It was felt that Lynde v. Lynde did not overrule
Barber v. Barber, but since the New York decree was not final, the Lynde case
controlled.6 3
In the Supreme Court of the United States, on writ of error brought by the wife,
the holding of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut was reversed and that
of the trial court affirmed.6 4 Mr. Justice White formulated the issue in these terms:
"Where a court of one state has decreed the future payment of alimony, and when an
installment or installments of the alimony so decreed have become due and payable and
are unpaid, is such a judgment as to accrued and past-due alimony ordinarily embraced
within the scope of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States
so as to impose the constitutional duty upon the court of another state to give effect to such
judgment?" 65
In answering this question, Mr. Justice White held that the two cases were not in
conflict, as contended by the opposing counsel, and if they were "Lynde v. Lynde
must be restricted or qualified so as to cause it not to overrule the decision in the
Barber case.' 66 This conclusion was reached on the following grounds. In the first
place, while in the Lynde case no reference was made to Barber v. Barber, it could
not be said that the earlier case was overlooked, because it was referred to by the
court below and was cited and commented on in the briefs of counsel in the Lynde
case. In the second place, in view of the careful opinion in the Barber case and of
the long interval between the two cases, and the fact that the state courts had uni-
formly accepted the rule laid down in Barber v. Barber, it could not be conceived
that the short opinion in Lynde v. Lynde was intended to change the settled rule of
constitutional construction which had so long prevailed. 7 Interpreting the two cases
as in harmony with each other:
"It results: First, that generally speaking, where a decree is rendered for alimony and is
made payable in future installments, the right to such installments becomes absolute and
vested upon becoming overdue, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause,
provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the install-
ments, since, as declared in the Barber case, 'alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of
separation from bed and board is as much a debt of record, until the decree has been re-
called, as any other judgment for money is.' Second, that this general rule, however, does
not obtain where, by the law of the state in which a judgment for future alimony is
rendered, the right to demand and receive such future alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent that no absolute or vested right attaches
to receive the installments ordered by the decree to be paid, even although no application
to annul or modify the decree in respect to alimony has been made prior to the installments
becoming due."68
"When rightly interpreted there is no lack of harmony between them." Id. at 7, 66 Ad. 772 (1907).
6' Supra, note 61.
032I8 U. S. I, it (r9o9). 65 Id. at 15.
"' Mr. Justice White said that the ruling in the Lynde case was expressly based upon the latitude of
discretion which the New Jersey courts were assumed to possess over a decree for the payment of future
alimony. Id. at 15-16. " Id. at 16-17.
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It was then found that the New York statutes did not expressly give the power to
revoke or modify the accrued installments. They were not, therefore, so completely
within the discretion of the court as to bring them within the exceptional rule em-
bodied in the second proposition set forth above.
"And every reasonable implication must be resorted to against the existence of such power,
in the absence of clear language manifesting an intention to confer it."69
The Sistare case thus promulgated a test to be employed to determine whether
full faith and credit is to be given an F-i alimony decree directing payment in future
installments in case the wife seeks in F-2 to collect the accrued sums. If the F-x court
can alter, modify or annul even as to the accrued installments, the F-2 tribunal need
not allow recovery thereon. But if the decree cannot be so altered, modified or
annulled, it must be recognized. The whole problem thus becomes one of resolving
the power of the F-ir court. The case further formulated a rule of construction. If a
statute or decree does not in clear and express words grant or reserve the power to
alter or annul, every reasonable implication is to be resorted to against such power.
Every effort is to be made to apply the rule of the Sistare case. It seems to be the
desire of the court to enforce such installment payments wherever possible, but at
the same time to adhere to the patterns laid down for the enforcement of foreign
money judgments generally. The tests laid down in the Sistare case have apparently
been adequate because in the thirty years since that decision no other case, on this
exact point, has been considered by the Supreme Court.
The state courts have consistently followed the rule of the Sistare case. Where
W has obtained in F-i a decree for alimony payable in future installments, the decree
being unalterable and revocable as to accrued sums, she has uniformly been held en-
titled to recover these payments in F-2.70 Very properly every effort has been made
to make the wife's claim enforceable. This is as it should be. But the state courts
have refused to give full faith and credit to the F-i decree where such decree is so
within the discretion of the F-s court as to past due installments that the qualification
mentioned by Mr. Justice White applies. Thus, where W has secured a decree for
"Id. at 22, per White, J.
"'Cotter v. Cotter, 225 Fed. 471, 475 (C. C. A. gth, 19r5): "In Washington, while the court may
discontinue alimony permanently when granted in monthly installments until further order of the court,
it may not modify a decree as to installments of alimony past due and unpaid." Per Wolverton, J.; Straus
v. Straus, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 461, 41 P. (2d) 218 (x935); Phillips v. Kepler, 47' App. D. C. 384 (x918);
Carmona v. Naron, 37 Idaho 482, 217 Pac. 597 (923); Paulin v. Paulin, 195 Ill. App. 350 (1915);
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 Ad. 840 (927); Taylor v. Stowe, 218 Mass. 248, 1o5 N. E.
890 (1914); Gutowski v. Gutowski, 266 Mich. I, 253 N. W. 192 (934); McCullough v. McCullough,
203 Mich. 288, 105 N. W. 890 (1918); Tehsman v. Tehsman, 93 N. J. Eq. 76, 114 Ad. 320 (1921);
Bolton v. Bolton, 86 N. J. L. 622, 92 Ad. 389 (1914); Babcock v. Babcock, 147 Misc. 900, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 470 (1933)
, 
aff'd, 239 App. Div. 884, 265 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1933), appeal dism'd, 263 N. Y. 665,
189 N. E. 747 (1934); Beech v. Beech, 211 App. Div. 720, 208 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1925); Van Horn v. Van
Horn, x96 App. Div. 472, 188 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1921); Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819,
x58 N. Y. Supp. 851 (1gx6); Williamson v. Williamson, 169 App. Div. 597, 155 N. Y. Supp. 423
(i915); Patton v. Patton, 67 Misc. 404, 123 N. Y. Supp. 329 (i9io); Armstrong v. Armstrong, X17 Ohio
St 558, 16o N. E. 34 (927); Campbell v. Campbell, 28 Okla. 838, i5 Pac. 11s1 (rgzr); De Vail v.
De Vail, 57 Ore. 128, 109 Pac. 755 (r91o); Stewart v. Stewart, 593 Ad. 86o (N. J. 1937); Caples v.
Buell, 234 S. W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 192i); Caples v. Caples, 47 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930 )
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future alimony in F-i, which is there subject to the discretion and power of the F-1
court, even as to accrued installments, she has been denied relief in F-2, under the
qualification of the rule in Sistare v. Sistare.71 The judgment even in F-i was in no
sense final.
The law of F-i, statutory as well as judicial, thus becomes the determining factor
in deciding whether the F-z decree calling for installment payments is to be enforced
in F-2. The proof of the F-i law is, therefore, of paramount importance. On this
point no uniform policy has been adopted. A number of courts require the plaintiff
to allege and prove that the F-z decree, as to accrued installments, is not subject to
modification. In Lape v. Miller,72 the court said:
"Courts of one state do not take judicial knowledge of the laws of another one, whether
they be statutory or of judicial determination; and the existence of such laws, as well as
their import, force and effect, must be proven, if denied, the same as any other fact in
issue."73
Other courts throw the burden of proving the F-z law upon the defendant. In
Curran v. Curran,74 the court stated:
"Here there is no proof by the defendant, .. to show that the right to recover the arrears
of alimony is not a vested one. Nor has it been shown that the decree has been modified
prior to the coming due of the installments."
The courts which adopt this view indulge in a presumption that the F-1 decree is
final in regard to accrued installments. 75 This view is preferable both from the legal
and the social standpoint. The defendant is trying to escape compliance with the F-s
judgment; the burden, therefore, should be placed on him. Every effort should be
72 McAlister v. McAlister, 214 Ala. 345, 107 So. 843 (1926) [in regard to a Louisiana decree]; Lapc v.
Miller, 203 Ky. 742, 263 S. W. 22 (1926) [the defendant had answered that the Ohio decree was not
final even as to accrued installments, and it was held that the plaintiff's demurrer thereto should have been
overruled, the court refusing to take notice of Ohio law]; Webster v. Webster, 177 La. 3o6, 148 So. 241
(1933) [where it was held that under Michigan law even accrued installments remained subject to court
modification; MicH. Comyp. LAws (1929) §12747; Skinner v. Skinner, 205 Mich. 243, 171 N. W. 383
(x919)]; Gallant v. Gallant, 154 Miss. 832, 123 So. 883 (1929) [in regard to Louisiana law; LA. Cv.
CODE (Dart, 1932) art. x6o]; Bentley v. Calabrese, 155 Misc. 843, 28o N. Y. Supp. 454 (935) [in re-
gard to Massachusetts law, Williamson v. Williamson, 246 Mass. 270, 14o N. E. 799 (1923); McElroy v.
McElroy, 208 Mass. 458, 94 N. E. 696 (191i); Hill v. Hill, 196 Mass. 5o9, 82 N. E. 690 (1907), MASS.
GE. LAws (1932), C. 2o8, §37]; Smith v. Smith, 249 App. Div. 660, 291 N. Y. Supp. 635 (1936) [in
regard to New Jersey law]; Levine v. Levine, 95 Ore. 94, i87 Pac. 609 (1920) [in. regard to Minnesota
law]; Hanson v. Hanson, i8 F. Supp. 527 (M. D. Pa. 1937) [where the court followed the interpretation
of New Jersey law laid down in Lynde v. Lynde]; Hewett v. Hewett, 44 R. 1. 308, 1x6 Ad. 883 (1922)
[in regard to Massachusetts law]; Gaffey v. Criteser, 195 S. W. ix66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), all'd, Criteser
v. Gaffey, 222 S. W. 193 (1920) [in regard to Oregon law]; Ogg v. Ogg, 165 S. W. 912 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) [in regard to New York law].
72203 Ky. 742, 746, 263 S. V. 22 (1924), per Thomas, J.
"Accord: Page v. Page, supra note 54; Ogg v. Ogg, supra note 71.
71 136 Misc. 598, 6oo, 240 N. Y. Supp. 64 (1930), per Noonan, J.
'
5 Alexander v. Alexander, 164 S. C. 466, 472, x62 S. E. 437 (1932): 'The finality of the Maryland
decree as to the right of the plaintiff to payments fully matured under its provisions must be presumed
when there is no proof of any Maryland law to the contrary." Per Blease, C. J. See also Phillips v. Kepler,
47 App. D. C. 384, 387 (1918).
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made in F-2 to enforce the decree. A few courts of their own accord examine the
law of F-z. In Hewett v. Hewett,7" the court said:
"The case is before us on demurrer and unless we take judicial notice of the laws of
Massachusetts we have no information as to whether the plaintiff by virtue of the decree
in question has a vested right to demand and receive the installments which have become
due."
And above all it is to be noted that the courts follow the rule of construction set forth
by Mr. Justice White in Sistare v. Sistare. This policy has been well expressed in
Phillips v. Kepler:77
"If we may reason from the rule which obtains in statutory construction, a retroactive effect
should not be given to the exercise of any power to recast a decree, unless the language
defining the power leaves no choice" 7 8
On the whole the state courts have adhered rather closely to the federal doctrine
enunciated in Sistare v. Sistare.79 They have not given effect to the F-i decree unless
required to do so by the full faith and credit clause.
At this point reference must be made to the Minnesota case of Holten v. Holten.s °
The plaintiff had obtained in Oregon a divorce with alimony of $i5o a month during
her lifetime. The husband having moved to Minnesota, and the wife having applied
to the divorce court for a judgment covering the unpaid installments, a decree was
entered in her favor for $6,076.75. She then sued the defendant in Minnesota to
recover this sum. The trial tribunal, finding that the Oregon court did not have
power to modify accrued installments,'" gave judgment for $6,076.75 with interest.
While the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not agree as to this point with the trial
court the decision was affirmed.8 2 The court said:
"Following Sistare v. Sistare, we hold that so long as the judgment is absolute in its terms
and remains unmodified, or at least until an application for modification has been made, it
is final as to instalments of alimony which have accrued. Sound public policy forbids the
adoption of a rule which would permit a husband to escape his obligation to support his
wife or infant children by crossing a state line. ' 83
For reasons of policy the court excluded the qualification of the general rule enun-
ciated in Sistare v. SistareY4 and held that even if a judgment fo alimony is subject
to modification as to accrued installments, it is still entitled to full faith and credit
in F-2, so long as no application for modification appears to have been made. It is
thus in conflict with Lynde v. Lynde,s 5 going much further than is required by the
70 44 R. I. 308, 310-311, xi6 Ad. 883 (s922), per Rathbun, J. Contra: Lape v. Miller, supra note 71.
77 47 App. D. C. 384, 387 (918), per Smyth, C. J.
71 See also Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 70; Levine v. Levine, supra note 71.
" See the cases cited in notes 70 and 7.
so 153 Minn. 346, 190 N. W. 542 (922). 8 Id. at 348, 19o N. W. 542.
" "We also hold that irrespective of the so-called judgment of December 31, x9i9 [the Oregon judg-
ment for accrued alimony], the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of the installments which had
accrued." Id. at 352, 190 N. W. 542, 544, per Lees, C.
s' Id. at 351, 190 N. W. 542, 544-
8, See supra note 59. 88Supra note 45.
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full faith and credit clause. The rule is apparently broadened to include all decrees
for alimony. Though improperly based on the full faith and credit clause, where no
application has been, made to modify the F-i decree, the decision might be justified
on the ground of comity,8s on the theory that the Supreme Court merely prescribed
the minimum recognition which must be accorded the F-i decree. It is submitted
that Holten v. Holten exhibits an enlightened policy.
The California courts and those of a few other states have gone still farther. They
have established the F-i decree as a judgment of their own courts.8 7 The decree can
thus be enforced as a domestic judgment. New York by statute has in a limited type
of case done something much the same.88
Hitherto our discussion has been devoted to the problem of permanent alimony--
nothing has been said concerning the recovery in F-2 of payments accruing under an
F-i decree for alimony pendente lite.8 9 The object is to provide for the wife during
the pendency of some matrimonial suit. Such an award is always subject to modifica-
tion or revocation by the court which granted it.
"An award of temporary alimony creates a mere personal right limited in its enforcement
to the proceeding pending which it was granted. In re Hudes' Estate, 128 Misc. 362, 2 9
N. Y. S. 435. All proceedings to compel the payment of temporary alimony are limited to
the action in which the order for alimony was granted.... Thus it would appear that
temporary alimony awarded in the State of New York may not be reduced to final
judgment under the Practice Act of that state." 90
This being the situation, it is not at all surprising to find that the F-2 courts follow
the qualification laid down in Sistare v. Sistare, and refuse to enforce an F-i decree
for alimony pendente lite. This is the position very generally taken. 91 Not being a
final judgment for an absolute debt, the husband's duty being subject to modification,
"no action can be maintained on a mere interlocutory order for alimony pendente
lite."92
8o 41 A. L. R. 1419, 1421 (1926).
"
T Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 357, 55 P. (2d) 228 (1936); Straus v. Straus, 4 Cal. App. (2d)
461, 41 P. (2d) 218 (1935); Creager v. District Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. (2d) 552 (1932); Cum-
mings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929).
88 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr, §§1I71, 1172.
80 See 2 Vaaun, AmERIcAN FAMILY LAws 309-321, 460-462.
"'Kelly v. Kelly, 121 N. J. Eq. 361, 362-363, 189 Ad. 665 (937), per Rafferty, J. See Doncourt v.
Doncourt, 245 App. Div. 9i , 281 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1935); N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT, §1169.
91 Kelly v. Kelly, supra note 9o . The plaintiff wife sued in New Jersey to recover, the arrears of
alimony pendente lite awarded in a New York divorce suit. A decree in favor of the plaintiff was reversed.
Since under New York law accrued temporary alimony is subject to extinguishment by the termination
of the action, it may also be modified. "If the prerequisite judgment may not be entered in the New York
courts which granted the award of temporary alimony, that award may not be enforced in another forum.
Further, if temporary alimony may not form the basis for an independent action in New York and if
proceedings for the collection of any arrears of temporary alimony must be brought in the action in which
the order was granted and is not otherwise enforceable, it would seem illogical to permit temporary
alimony to form the basis of an independent action in a foreign jurisdiction." Per Rafferty, J., at 365.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 113 Conn. 306, 155 Ad. 217 (931); Geisler v. Geisler, 124 Ky. 292, 98 S. W.
1023 (1907); Mills v. Mills, 95 Misc. 231, 158 N. Y. Supp. 753 (igi6); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 48
Wash. 388, 93 Pac. 670 (x9o8); Henry v. Henry, 74 W. Va. 563, 82 S. E. 522 (1914).
02 2 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAws 1393. Compare Paul v. Paul, 121 Kan. 88, 90, 245 Pac. x022 (1926),
petition for rehearing denied, 121 Kan. 363 (1926): "The present case may perhaps be distinguished from
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Again, it would seem that the courts are being overly technical; that they are
unduly influenced by the law concerning the extraterritorial enforcement of money
judgments in general; that they have failed to consider the social problems involved
in the award pf temporary alimony. Here, even more than in the case of permanent
alimony, is the award based upon the necessities of the wife. If the husband is able
to escape his obligations by going to F-2, something is the matter with the law in
this field.
So far we have discussed alimony that is due and payable. We must now turn to
the problem of future installments. What can the wife do in F-2 in regard to such?
Not having accrued, not being due and owing, they are not a debt within the tech-
nical meaning of the term. Generally by express reservation in the decree or by
statute the F-r court is empowered to revoke or modify such future payments.93
Certainly, under the qualification enunciated in the Sistare case,94 it would seem clear
that the Supreme Court would not require that full faith and credit be accorded
thereto.
The enforcement of future payments necessitates making the F-i judgment a
decree of the F-2 tribunal. This would enable the wife to invoke the sanctions avail-
able to one obtaining a local alimony decree.
From a social standpoint, much can be said in favor of such a view. In the first
place, instead of forcing the wife to sue again and again for accrued payments as
they become due, she would have a more effective remedy. Again, a delinquent hus-
band would not be favored, as he now is in F-2, but would be subject to the full
sanctions of a local decree. Certainly, no one would quarrel with this. Furthermore,
it is clearly in the public interest that the husband's obligation to support his wife
and children be enforced up to the hilt. Lastly, the fact that the decree is subject to
modification by the F-r tribunal would of itself be no reason why it should not be
made a decree of F-2, especially where no such modification has occurred. That
forum can by appropriate action conform its decree thereto.
Those courts which adhere to the strict analysis of Sistare v. Sistare, bothered as
they are by the "lump concept" of viewing a decree for alimony as a mere money
judgment, uniformly deny such enforcement to the plaintiff. On the basis of the
enforcement of money judgment generally, this is logical, but it is submitted that
there is more at stake where problems of support are involved. These courts say that
the plaintiff has ample protection by bringing her action for accrued installments.90 5
these [supra] by the fact of the order for temporary alimony having explicitly been made enforceable by
execution, giving it to that extent the character of a final judgment." Per Mason, J. See also Wallace v.
Wallace, axs Cal. App. 500, 295 Pac. xo61 (1931).
8 See supra note 30. 8' See supra note 59.
o German v. German, x22 Conn. 155, 164-x65, i88 Ad. 429, 432-433 (1936): "As regards instalments
due in the future, there would be no question of the power of the courts of New York to modify the
decree.... The decree before us is not, therefore, enforceable in our courts as regards payments falling due
in the future." Per Matbie, C. J. See also Kossower v. Kossower, 142 Ad. 30 (N. J. 1928).
Alexander v. Alexander, x64 S. C. 466, 476-477, 162 S. E. 437 (1932): "In Maryland courts of equity
have power to modify provisions as to alimony in decrees of divorce a mensta or a vinculo and retain
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But a few courts, led by California, have allowed the plaintiff to establish the F-i
decree as a decree of the F-2 tribunal, and give enforcement thereto the same as to a
local decree. 9 In Cummings v. Cummings,97 the judgment was for a sum equal to
the amount due under the New York judgment, including all installments down to
the entry of the judgment, and for $65 per month thereafter, but only so long as the
decree of the New York court remained unmodified, leave being given to apply for
a modification if the New York court modified its decree, giving the plaintiff the
equitable relief to which she would be entitled under a California decree.08 In Palen
v. Palen,99 the court said:
"It is settled that a judgment for alimony obtained in another state may be established in
this state for the purpose of enforcing it as a continuing judgment in this state for the
payment of alimony."
The courts of a few other states have been willing to do the same thing.'00 This
trend, while still imperceptible, is, it is submitted, clearly a step in the right direction.
If the decree is final and not subject to modification even as to the future install-
ments, what about the situation? 101 Would the position taken primarily by the
California courts be more sound? Possibly so, but the argument can still be made
that the installments not having accrued, they are not due and do not constitute a
debt. Therefore, the decree will not be enforced until the payments have become
due. The question really is whether the F-x decree is to be enforced at law or in
continuing jurisdiction over such decrees as to future payments of alimony. For these reasons the decree is
not a final one in respect to the future payments of alimony." Per Blease, C. J.
"0 See cases cited in note 87, supra.
07 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929), discussed in (1932) 29 COL. L. REV. 832.
" Creager v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. (2d) 552 (1932), discussed in (x933) 81 U. ov
PA. L. REv. 342: Petitioner's wife was granted a divorce by a Nevada court, and the petitioner was ordered
to pay $30 a month alimony. By a bill in equity in California she secured an order directing payment of
the amount in arrears and establishing the Nevada decree. On the petitioner's failure to observe this
decree, the court ordered him to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt for failure
to comply with its decree. The petitioner then brought a writ of prohibition, claiming that there was no
equitable jurisdiction in the California court, since the Nevada decree was enforceable there only as a
money judgment. It was held that the equitable enforcement was proper. "We think it entirely clear that
the judgment of the respondent court gave full faith and credit to the Nevada decree in its entirety. By
its terms the Nevada judgment was 'established herein as a foreign judgment.' If such recognition exceeds
the requirements of the federal Constitution, but is authorized by the laws of this state, petitioner may
not complain .... For the purpose of enforcement in this state, we believe that the respondent court
properly treated its own judgment, based upon and establishing the Nevada judgment, in the same manner
as an award of alimony by the respondent court." Per Spence, J., pp. 282-283.
go 12 Cal. App. (2d) 357, 358, 55 P. (2d) 288 (1936), per Gould, J. Here a Missouri judgment was
established as a judgment of the California court. In Straus v. Straus, supra note 87, the same was done
with a New York decree.
'"Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927), discussed in (1928) 41 HAtv. L, REv.
798; Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. (2d) 897 (936); Shibley v. Shibley, xii Wash. 166,
42 P. (2d) 446, 97 A. L. R. 111 (1935).
In Fanchier v. Gammill, the court said: "A decree for alimony granted by a foreign court may be
established and enforced by and through courts of equity in one state, and that our equity courts may
assume jurisdiction of the alimony decree and establish and enforce it." Per Holden, J., at 737.
... This was the situation in Fanchier v. Gammill, supra note ioo, and in Creager v. Superior Court,
supra note 98. By Nevada practice an alimony decree is not open to modification. Swceney v. Sweeney,
42 Nev. 431, 179 Pac. 638 (I919).
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equity. At law relief can be given only for what is due, while equity may direct
payment in the future.
Let us now summarize the law as it has developed since the case of Barber v.
Barber. An alimony decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in F-i, is, under
certain circumstances, a debt of record, entitled to full faith and credit in F-2. If it
calls for a lump sum payment, it will, on the analogy of an ordinary money judg-
ment, be enforced. Where the decree calls for periodic payments, it is enforceable in
F-2 as to the sums due only if the F-i court has not the power, to alter or revoke the
accrued installments. But if the F-i court has such power, then, since no right to
alimony vests in the wife, she cannot recover even the sums which have accrued,
save in a few states. In such a case, however, if she gets the F-i tribunal to give a
judgment for the sums due, such judgment, like any other money decree, will serve
as the basis for an action in F-2. Where the language of the F-i statute or decree
reserving the power to alter or annul is not perfectly clear, every reasonable implica-
tion is resorted against the existence of such power. Furthermore, most jurisdictions
as we have seen, refuse to give any effect to payments which have not fallen due. A
few states, it is true, have established the F-i decree as a judgment of their own courts
in order to enforce future payments. And lastly, no action can be maintained on an
interlocutory order of F-i for alimony pendente lite.
We must now consider how and in what ways the F-2 court will enforce the F-i
decree for alimony. Hitherto our discussion has been in regard to the type of
alimony which F-2 must recognize. In German v. German, 02 the court stated:
"The constitutional provision, however, only requires that the courts of a state other than
that in which the decree is rendered shall give effect to it by the ordinary remedies appro-
priate to an action upon a judgment; that court is not required to apply any special
remedies provided by the laws of the State in which the decree was rendered, nor any
special remedies provided by its own laws to enforce similar decrees made by its own
courts."103
Thus, under proper circumstances, F-2 must give full faith and credit to the F-i ali-
mony decree; it is a final and conclusive adjudication of the rights of the spouses.
But it has been stated again and again that F-2 need not give to the wife the special
remedies to which she would have been entitled in F-i.10 4 Certainly it would not be
expected that F-2 should give the wife remedies which it is not empowered to use in
the enforcement of its own decrees. And similarly the position has been taken quite
102 122 Conn. 155, x58, I88 Ad. 429 (1936), per Maltbie, C. J.
2o See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, supra note 23. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1377: "The method of en-
forcement of a foreign judgment is governed by the law of the forum."
10. Lynde v. Lynde, supra note 45; Sistare v. Sistare, supra note 59; White v. White, 223 Mass. 39,
123 N. E. 389 (igig); Bullock v. Bullock, 5 N. J. Eq. 444, 27 Ad. 435 (1893); Tiedemann v. Tsede-
mann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N. Y. Supp. 851 (x916). In the latter case, the court stated: "But this
duty does not require the enforcement of the judgment of the sister state, and, therefore, does not apply to .
the provisions of a judgment in a suit in equity which are incidental to the main relief, and are in the
nature of an execution of the judgment itsf..... But if the courts of this State should require the de-
fendant to account for any community property there may be here, that would be enforcing the Nevada
decree and the incidental provision thereof based' upon the statute law of that State which has no extra-
territorial effect... " Per Laughlin, J., at 824-825.
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generally that the special remedies available in regard to a local alimony decree are
not open to the wife.10 5
The enforcement of a foreign judgment, at common law, was by an action of
debt. This is still the ordinary remedy by which to enforce a foreign money judg-
ment. On the theory that a decree for alimony is a mere money judgment, the F-2
courts very generally restrict the wife to an action of debt.10 According to these
courts, the F-z alimony decree is, when before them, merely a debt of record just like
any other debt, having lost any special characteristics it may have had as a decree for
alimony.10 7 Crossing the state frontier, therefore, produces far-reaching effects-the
alimony decree becomes a mere money judgment for which the appropriate remedy
is an action at law-no resort to equity being permitted because the legal remedy is
plain, adequate and complete.' 08
Mr. Justice Wayne said in the famous case of Barber v. Barber:10
"And such a judgment or decree, rendered in any state of the United States, the court
having jurisdiction, will be carried into judgment in any other state, to have there the same
binding force that it has in the state in which it was originally given. For such a purpose,
both the equity courts of the United States and the same courts of the states have jurisdic-
tion."
Had this language been followed, the law concerning the enforcement of foreign
alimony decrees would have developed along quite different lines. But it was in
conflict with the statements Mr. Justice Wayne had made many years before in
M'Elmoyle v. Cohen." 0 And it was not until sixty-nine years after these words were
uttered that a court for the first time proceeded in accordance therewith. In Fanchier
' Lynde v. Lynde, 41 App. Div. 280, 58 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1899), afl'd, x63 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979
(19oo).
1o' Grant v. Grant, 75 F. (2d) 655 (App. D. C. 1935), where the wife's bill in equity to have the
court direct the defendant "to specifically perform" a Maryland alimony decree was dismissed; Davis v.
Davis, 29 App. D. C. 258, 263 (1907), where the wife's prayer for the execution of a Kansas decree was
denied for want of jurisdiction in equity, because she had an adequate remedy at law, Shepard, C. J.,
stating: "For all purposes of its enforcement in this jurisdiction, therefore, the award of alimony (Kansas
decree) is to be regarded as a debt, merely, and enforceable only as such by execution at law"; Worslcy v.
Worsley, 76 F. (2d) 8,5 (1935), where the wife's bill to enforce a Virginia alimony decree was dismissed
on authority of Grant v. Grant and Davis v. Davis; Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. x18, 174 N. E. 2o6
(i93i), discussed in (193i) 29 Mic. L. REv. 1071, compare White v. White, 223 Mass. 39, 123 N. E.
389 (i919); Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92 (19o5); Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W.
89o (i9o8), where contempt proceedings were held not available to enforce an Oklahoma decree; Kossower
v. Kossower, 142 Ad. 30 (N. J. 1928); Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 3o6, 49 Ad. 5o (i9o), where
the court refused to enforce a North Dakota decree, saying: 'This provision (the full faith and credit
clause) does not make the foreign decree or judgment a record to be enforced without further proceedings
in the state to which it is taken, nor does it refer to the remedy or means of enforcing it, but only provides
that the facts found in the foreign court upon which the judgment or decree was entered cannot be
inquired into by the courts of the sister states." Per Voorhees, J., pp. 307-308; Wood v. Wood, 7 Misc.
579, 28 N. Y. Supp. 154 (894).
Compare Wagner v. Wagner, supra note 27.
MicH. Com. LAws (1929) §§12770-12772, provide that the foreign alimony decree is enforceable by
an action at law.
""
7 See cases cited in note io6; also White v. White, 223 Mass. 39, 139 N. E. 389 (x919).
Davis v. Davis, supra note io6; Bennett v. Bennett, supra note xo6.
1o9 21 How. 582, 591 (U. S. 1858). "o Supra note 23.
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v. Gammill,'11 a wife who had secured in Nevada a divorce with alimony payable
in installments, brought a bill in equity in Mississippi to enforce the decree and to
recover the arrears. On appeal the judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer
was reversed. On policy grounds the wife was not restricted to legal execution; the
F-2 equity court may enforce the F-i alimony decree. 112 The Mississippi court felt
that it was required under the full faith and credit clause to establish the Nevada
decree and to enforce it by equitable process, because an alimony decree is entitled to
the extraordinary means of enforcement on account of its peculiar characteristics.
California, as we have seen, has on several occasions, pursued a similar policy l3
In Cousineau v. Cousineau,1 14 in addition to back sums due under a California de-
cree the defendant was ordered to make the payments in the future, the California
decree as to the future installments was thus made the basis of an Oregon judgment.
The court stated:
"If comity is the basis of the full faith and credit requirement, the decisions of our neigh-
boring states (California and Washington), ought to be peculiarly persuasive, and we
should endeavor to do as much for our neighbors as their courts stand prepared to do for
the people of this state." ' 15
In Shibley v. Shibley,"1 6 the Washington court gave equitable enforcement to a Cal-
ifornia alimony decree.11 7 The Minnesota court followed suit in Ostrander v. Os-
trander.""' The Connecticut court in German v. German"1 9 enforced by contempt
... Supra note ioo.
2 "It is our view that, on account of the character of a judgment for alimony, which rests, to some
extent, upon public policy, in requiring a husband to support his wife and children, due to the sacred
human relationship, and that they may not become public charges and derelicts, the decree for alimony,
with the extraordinary power of enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings, should be estab-
lished and enforced by our equity court, which has full and sole jurisdiction of all matters of divorce and
alimony; because to hold that a foreign judgment for alimony can be enforced in this state only by
execution, the same as judgments at law, would be to impair or to deprive a foreign judgment for alimony
of its inherent power of enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings. Thus, as we view it, to
so hold would be to disregard the 'full faith and credit' clause of the Federal law, which we interpret
to mean that the judgment, with its peculiar right of enforcement, as one for alimony, should be estab-
lished and enforced by the equity courts of our state in the same manner, and to the same extent, as it
could have been enforced by our court if originally obtained in our state." Per Holden, J., at 737.
"' Creager v. District Court, supra note 98; Cummings v. Cummings, supra note 97. In the Cummings
case, it is true, because the husband had done everything he could to evade the New York alimony decree,
the court had ample reason to feel that the wife's legal remedy was inadequate.
l 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. (ad) 897 (936).155 Id. at 197, 63 P. (2d) 897 (1936), per Rossman, J.
Ia x8i Wash. 166, 42 P. (2d) 446 0935).
117 "We adopt this procedure not on account of the rule of comity enjoined by the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal constitution, but because, as a matter of public concern and equitable power, the
enforcement in this state of such decrees for alimony and support money should not depend solely upon
ordinary execution, but that the common practice in this state with respect to all the remedies for the
enforcement of such decrees as if originally entered here should be followed and enforced." Per Mitchell,
J., at 170.
18 19 o Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449 0934), discussed in (934) i8 Mica. L. REv. 589, (1934) 11
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 634, (1934) 1 U. oF Cm. L. Rlv. 811: The plaintiff had been awarded in South
Dakota a divorce with alimony payable in installments. Her husband who had remarried wilfully refused
to comply with the judgment. He had no property on which execution could be levied, and he persistently
assigned his salary to his second wife to escape payment. The plaintiff obtained equitable relief in
Minnesota to compel payment, the trial court having found that the wife had no adequate remedy at law.
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process alimony which had accrued under a New York decree, but refused to order
specific performance of the judgment because the New York courts retain the power
to modify future alimony.
Thus Fanchier v. Gammill has been followed. by a small but respectable body of
authority. But the later decisions have not been placed on the requirement of the
full faith and credit clause. This, it is submitted, is correct; a state is not obligated
to afford any different relief to an F-i alimony decree than it affords to any ordinary
F-i money judgment.120 But it is not prevented from doing so if it so desires. And
it must further be noted that in Ostrander v. Ostrander and German v. German
equitable enforcement was given merely in regard to the accrued payments, while
in the other cases the F-i decree was established so as to secure future sums as well.
Even prior to Fanchier v. Gammill, New York, by statutory enactment, had taken
steps to give the wife a more effective remedy in regard to the F-i alimony decree.
This was because of Lynde v. Lynde,121 which had denied to the wife in New York
in the enforcement of the New Jersey alimony decree the statutory remedies of
security, receivership, sequestration and contempt process. To remedy this situa-
tion 2 2 Sections 1772 and 1773 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now Civil Practice Act,
Sections 1171123 and I172,24 were amended in 19o4.
For Section 1171 to apply, the alimony order must have been given in a suit for
divorce on the ground of adultery, or in a suit for separation for one of the grounds
specified in Civil Practice Act, Section 1161,125 and the action must be brought to
"Because of the nature of defendant's obligation and its origin, the enforcement of his duty is as much in
need of attention of sovereign power as though he had remained in South Dakota. Transplantation of the
parties from one state to another has not reduced the obligation to the ordinary category of 'a debt of
record.' " Per Stone, J., at 549. ... Supra note 95.
"' Lynde v. Lynde, supra note 45; Sistare v. Sistare, supra note 59.
1 14 App. Div. 280, 58 N. Y. Supp. 567 (5899), afl'd, x62 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979 (1900).
. See Moore v. Moore, 143 App. Div. 428, 431, 128 N. Y. Supp. 711 (911).
" ' Civ. PR.Ac. Aar, §1171: "Where a judgment rendered or an order made in this state for divorce or
separation, or a judgment rendered in another state for divorce upon the ground of adultery, or for
separation or separate support for any of the causes specified in section eleven hundred and sixty-one of
this act, upon which an action ha' been brought in this state and judgment rendered therein, requirs a
husband to provide.., for the support of his wife, the court, in its discretion, may also direct him to give
reasonable security ... for the payment, from time to time, of the sums of money required for that pur-
pose. If he fails to give the ecurity, or to make any payment required by the terms of such judgment or
order, whether he has or has not given security therefor, or to pay any sum of money for the expenses of
the plaintiff, or her support and maintenance,... the court may cause his personal property and the rents
and profits of his real property to be sequestered, and may appoint a receiver thereof...." The italicized
portions were added by N. Y. Laws 1904, c. 318.
"" N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Aar §1172: "Where the husband, in an action for divorce or separation, or for
the enforcement in this state of a judgment for divorce or separation rendered in another state, makes
default in paying any sum of money as required by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof,
and it appears presumptively, to the satisfaction of the court, that payment cannot be enforced by means
of the sequestration of his property, or by resorting to the security, ... the court may, in its discretion,
make an order requiring the husband to show cause ... why he should not be punished for his failure to
make the payment; and thereupon proceedings must be taken to punish him, as prescribed in article
nineteen of the judiciary law for the punishment of a contempt of court other than a criminal contempt.
." The italicized portions were added in 1904.
.. The grounds for a judicial separation are:
"(s) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) such conduct on the
part of the defendant toward the plaintiff as may render it unsafe and improper for the latter to cohabit
THiE ENFORCEmENT OF FOREIGN DECREES FOR ALIMONY
judgment in New York. These conditions the New York courts have rigidly en-
forced.' 26 If the divorce or separation was obtained on grounds other than those
specified, Section 1171 does not apply. 22 Furthermore, the F-i decree must be re-
duced to judgment in New YorkP-s This is not done by a suit in equity even though
equitable remedies are granted.', If the court, under Section I71, orders the hus-
band to give security and he fails to do so, contempt proceedings are not available,
sequestration being the limit of the statutory remedy.130 And in Boissevain v. Boisse-
vain,' 31 it was held that Section 1171 is not applicable where the alimony decree was
rendered in a foreign country (Holland, in this case) and not in a sister state.
Section 172132 allows contempt proceedings to enforce the duty to pay. It is to
be noted that this section does not in so many words contain the qualifications set
forth in Section I7i, that the F-i divorce must be on the ground of adultery or the
separation for one of grounds specified in Section 1161. Instead, it provides "for the
enforcement in this state of a judgment for divorce or separation rendered in another
state... ." It has been held, and it is submitted, properly, that this section must be
construed in the light of Section I7i, and that the two sections must therefore be
read 'together.-33 This would seem to have been the legislative intent-otherwise the
anomaly would result of allowing the sanction of contempt, the most powerful of
all alimony enforcement devices, in the case of all foreign decrees no matter what
the ground, and of restricting the lesser sanctions of security and sequestration to
decrees granted for the specified causes. Under this construction a foreign decree is
placed on a par with a domestic decree. Again, under Section 1172, in order to
obtain the statutory relief, the F-X decree must be made a judgment of the New York
court,'8 4 and a direction to pay granted in the judgment. Otherwise it will be con-
strued as an ordinary law judgment.135
with the former; (3) the abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant; (4) where the wife is plaintiff,
the neglect or refusal of the defendant to provide for her."
... Beech v. Beech, 211 App. Div. 720, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1925).
'e Beech v. Beech, supra note 126; Barber v. Warland, 139 Misc. 398, 247 N. Y. Supp. 455 (1930),
divorce in Massachusetts on ground of desertion.
12 Smith v. Smith, 249 App. Div. 66o, 291 N. Y. Supp. 635 (1936).
.2. Beech v. Beech, supra note 126: "The law is well settled that an action can be brought in this
state upon a judgment of this nature and a money judgment procured for alimony. Such a judgment
when obtained can be enforced in accordance with our laws applicable thereto. The action, however, is not
an equitable one, although the court may, in certain cases, under the provisions of section 1171 of the
Civil Practice Act, grant relief of an equitable nature." Per Merrell, J., at 721. Accord: Barber v. Warland,
supra note 127. Cf. Moore v. Moore, 143 App. Div. 428, i28 N. Y. Supp. 713 (i9si), afl'd, 2o8 N. Y.
97, x N. E. 711 (3913). 230 Moore v. Moore, supra note 129.
132 252 N. Y. 378, x69 N. E. 130 (1929), discussed in (1929) 29 COL. L. RaV. 522.
132 See note r24, supra.
.. Miller v. Miller, 2x9 App. Div. 6i, 2 9 N. Y. Supp. (3926), al'd without opinion, 246 N. Y. 636,
x59 N. E. 681 (1927): '"e believe that sections 117, and IX72 of the Civil Practice Act must be read
together, and as so read under the construction given by this court in the Beech case to section 1171 of the
Civil Practice Act, the plaintiff herein having sued on a decree of a foreign court (Nevada) granting a
divorce on the ground of cruelty, is limited under section 3372 of the Civil Practice Act to the recovery of
a money judgment for the amount representing alimony for the support of himself and her children due
and unpaid at the time specified in the order appealed from, which judgment can be enforced by execu-
tion." Per Burr, J., at 64-65. "' Rohden v. Rohden, supra note 24.
.. Wemple v. Wemple, 219 App. Div. 243, 2i9 N. Y. Supp. 638 (937).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Such is the state of the law concerning the enforcement in F-2 of an F-1 alimony
decree. The rule of the great majority of courts, restricting the wife to an action of
debt with the attendant legal execution, is open to serious objections. If the F-i
decree calls for periodic payments, suit can be brought in F-2 to recover only those
installments which have accrued. If the husband continues his delinquent ways, a
multiplicity of suits is inevitable. A long and, in some cases, a disastrous delay may
result during which the wife and children may suffer untold hardship. The law
side of the calendar often is badly overcrowded. Even after a judgment has been
secured against the husband, execution must issue, and this involves the discovery of
some property of the husband on which levy can successfully be had. If his assets
are of a liquid character, they can easily be concealed, or the husband can flee the
jurisdiction of the F-2 court, as he had formerly done in F-i. Furthermore, the law
gives the wife no protection as to the future. Each time a payment falls due she must
take legal action.
That the legal remedy is inadequate would seem self-evident. The ordinary F-z
money judgment calls for the reimbursement or compensation of the plaintiff. In
this situation of little social consequence, the action of debt is fairly satisfactory. But
an alimony decree providing for the vital necessities of wife and children presents an
entirely different picture.
To say that alimony is a debt of record and enforceable only at law because the
legal remedy is adequate and complete is entirely unrealistic. As before pointed
out, 3 6 the expression "debt of record" was adopted as a convenience in order to
signify that an equity decree was a judgment capable of supporting an action of debt.
As it has turned out the phrase has been unfortunate. Certainly alimony is much
more. From the standpoint of society the husband's duty, strongly guarded as it is
in F-s, with the full vigor of equitable enforcement, should not to such a large extent
be dissolved by his crossing a state line. The legal attributes of alimony vary greatly
from those of an ordinary money claim. Clearly the effective enforcement of the
obligation to support should not be denied merely because it is labeled a "debt."
It is no bar to the exercise of equitable jurisdiction that F-s alimony orders have long
been dealt with in F-2 by legal action.
The courts of F-2 say again and again that the full faith and credit clause requires
them to give effect to the F-i alimony decree. This means, according to them, the
recognition of such a decree as a debt. Technically, under the theory of stare decisis,
this is the law. But no decision of the Supreme Court has held that more cannot be
done. It is, of course, true that the modes of enforcement available in F-s are not,
under the full faith and credit clause, binding in F-2. But F-2 is not asked to enforce
the F-i decree, but to establish it as a judgment of its own. The language in
M'Elmoyle v. Cohen'37 that a judgment "can only be executed in the latter state
[F-2] as its laws may permit," in no way prevents an alimony judgment from becom-
ing an equity decree in F-2. The problem is not one of full faith and credit, that is,
... Supra note 42. "" Supra note 23.
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not whether F-2 is compelled so to act, but whether on the grounds of comity
adequate protection should be given the wife. It follows logically from this that
the equitable remedies in F-2, if there are any, should, therefore, be available to the
wife. True, F-2 should not give the alimony decree greater effect than it would have
had in F-i. But the equitable relief in F-2 is a matter of discretion and in this way
adequate protection will be given.
The alimony decree along with the effective enforcement thereof are important
not only in F-i. Adequate remedies in F-2 can be provided only through enforcement
in a court of equity with its vigorous sanctions, or by statute. Only in this way will
an alimony order serve its function nationally.
The California, Washington, Oregon, Minnesota, Mississippi and Connecticut
courts have of late indicated a willingness to look upon an F-r alimony judgment as
more than a mere debt of record. They have made the decree a judgment of their
own courts. This forward step is fundamentally sound and is based on proper
grounds of policy. New York has done much the same thing by means of legislation.
Some such steps are necessary, even imperative, if an alimony decree is to have
national consequences.
